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STRUCTURAL AND COGNITIVE POETICS: 
A COMPARISON
1. Introduction
Literary analysis that pays greater attention to the text itself than to more or 
less intuitive ideas about its meaning is a fairly recent invention. Its origin 
goes back to the famous Cours de Linguistique Générale published in 1916, 
three years after Ferdinand de Saussure’s death. The book became an inspira-
tion for specialists in literature convinced that literary studies should be scien-
tifi c rather than essayistic in nature and who strived to provide literary scholars 
with tools that would enable them to be more scientifi c. These theoreticians of 
literature wanted to analyse texts having at their disposal objective, verifi able 
methods. Thus, the concept of structure was born, a notion that stems from the 
belief that literature is a system, because it stems from language, which is also 
an organized entity. As Sturrock (2003: 99) observes: “literary structuralism is 
not the novelty which its opponents claim it to be. It is, rather, the latest, unu-
sually sophisticated stage (...) form of literary criticism that has existed since 
Aristotle.” This way of approaching literature, highly sophisticated indeed, 
had been developing largely unchallenged until the last decade of the 20th cen-
tury, when a new school was born, namely, cognitive poetics. Although again 
not quite revolutionary and openly acknowledging its resemblance with struc-
turalist poetics (Gavins and Steen 2003: 5–8), cognitive poetics offers a mark-
edly distinct way of approaching the text based on cognitive linguistics, itself 
a more recent development in the study of language.
Although the sources of inspirations for the two approaches to literary texts 
are different, not to say antithetical, it seems that in many respects they ar-
rive at quite similar results, even if obtained within distinct paradigms. In this 
article, I take a closer look at what exactly the differences between structur-
alist and cognitive poetics are and try to establish whether we can really say 
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that cognitive linguistics shows any signs of development compared with its 
predecessor. I will try to compare some selected aspects of the linguistic foun-
dations of the two schools, the way they treat meaning and fi nally, moving 
from theory to practice, I will compare the plot-analysis method as presented 
by Vladimir Propp (1928/1984) in his famous Morphology of the Folk Tale 
with the schema and scenario theory in Peter Stockwell’s (2006) rendering. 
2. Linguistic foundations
As already mentioned, the cornerstone of structuralism is Cours de Lin-
guistique Générale, presenting Ferdinand de Saussure’s seminal lectures on 
linguistics. It introduces the now widely known division of language into 
langue and parole, defi ning the former as “a system, an institution, a set of 
interpersonal rules and norms” and the latter as “the actual manifestation of 
the system in speech and writing” (Culler 1989: 8). This division, later re-
named by Noam Chomsky as competence and performance, basically cor-
responds to the idea that there is a coherent, rule-governed whole underlying 
all actual manifestations of language and consequently, also of literature. As 
a result, the aim of the literary critic is to look beyond the surface and search 
for invariants, regularities and general rules. It is assumed that literature (and 
entire culture) is, to use de Saussure’s nomenclature, a signifi ant, a semiotic 
device, a form by means of which a given meaning is expressed. It is also 
important that, from a structuralist standpoint, the form is a purely arbitrary 
construct as there is usually (onomatopoeic words being a notable excep-
tion) no natural relationship between the form of a word and its denotation. 
For example, what is referred to in English with the word butterfl y, in Polish 
is referred to with motyl and in Finnish with perhonen.
Cognitive linguistics takes a fundamentally different perspective on lan-
guage. Its main tenet is that all language is context-dependent, where context 
is understood as the entire extra-textual reality. As Stockwell (2006: 2) puts it: 
We think in forms that we do and we say things in the ways that we do, because we 
are all roughly human-sized containers of air and liquid with our main receptors at 
the top of our bodies. Our minds are embodied not just literally but also fi gurative-
ly, fi nally clearing away the mind-body distinction of much philosophy (...). 
What is meant by this is the belief that all utterances, from single words to nov-
els, are the expression of the way we perceive and organise our perception of 
the world in which we live, which in turn cannot be separated from our somatic
 experience. Thus, while structuralist linguistics looks up to mathematics as 
a source of inspiration, cognitive linguistics is mostly infl uenced by psychol-
15Structural and Cognitive Poetics: a Comparison
ogy. This results in a less formal approach to language, which, according to 
the opponents of cognitivism, diminishes the scientifi c value of this paradigm. 
Nevertheless, cognitivism opens up the possibility to investigate a wider range 
of phenomena which have hitherto evaded analysis. This may be seen, among 
other things, in the case of meaning-analysis.
3. The problem of meaning in structuralism and cognitive  
linguistics
To illustrate the structuralist approach to meaning, let us take a closer look at 
the theory proposed by Algirdas J. Greimas (Culler 1989: 75–96). Striving to 
provide a tool for semantic analysis, Greimas posited that every lexeme has 
an invariant core, which is established by extracting the common features, or 
“the essence” of the word present in all its possible readings in a given corpus. 
All changes in meaning result from attaching to this core contextually-condi-
tioned features called semes. Roughly speaking, a seme is an attribute chosen 
from two opposite features such as [male] vs. [female], or [good] vs. [bad]. 
The semantic analysis consists of two steps, namely, identifying the core and 
deciding what kind of attribute is used in a given context of use. For example, 
consider the following pair of sentences:
(1)  The dog barked at me.
(2)  The man barked at me.
The core meaning of to bark can be determined as ‘a sharp, vocal noise’ and 
the semes in question as consisting of the attributes [animal] and [human], 
respectively. This might seem a very neat tool for semantic analysis, but as 
Culler (1989) points out, it has two major disadvantages. Firstly, the analy-
sis requires compiling a list of all possible attributes and arranging them in 
a ‘semetic’ way and, secondly, it simply does not work, even in the case of the 
lexical items provided by Greimas. In his critique of Greimas’s theory, Culler 
(1989: 78) provides the following example from French: 
(3) La police aboie après le criminal.
 the police barks after the criminal
 ‘The police chase the criminal.’
(3) does not mean that the police bark after (aboie après) a criminal, but that 
they “chase him with the tenacity of hounds that have taken the scent and are 
in full cry” (Culler 1989: 78). It becomes a really arduous task to formulate in 
a formal fashion the link between ‘barking’, ‘speaking loudly’ and ‘pursuing’. 
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In fact, “the meaning is [...] constituted in deviation from the listed lexical fea-
tures” and “semantics [should] be able to account for the deviations and transi-
tions” (Fokkema and Kunne-Ibsch 1979: 73).
Cognitive linguistics seems capable of explaining such changes in a more 
regular fashion, thanks to the radial model of meaning (Tabakowska 1995: 46–
56). This model is based on the idea that metaphor is a basic cognitive tool, al-
lowing people to organise and classify new experience. Thus, the lexical item 
key understood both as ‘the key that opens the front door’ and as ‘the key to 
the exercises’ need not be treated as two separate lexemes, but as two senses 
of a single lexeme which are related by metaphorical extension. Similarly, the 
above-mentioned examples of ‘barking’ can be analysed either as involving 
a simple metaphorical extension, or, alternatively, as resulting from a meto-
nymical extension: as the activity of barking is very often connected with the 
activity of chasing, the mental proximity may be the vehicle of extension of 
meaning. And although this method rules out the possibility of formulaic de-
scription, it shows that different meanings of a word are not accidental, but can 
be traced down by means of cognitive tools.
3.1. Comparing the approaches: the analysis of myths
Having briefl y examined the theoretical background of the two schools of 
thought, let us now have a look at how theory infl uences practical analysis. 
As mentioned in section 1, the objects of comparison are Propp’s (1928/1984) 
structural approach to the analysis of the myth, and the schema and scenario 
theory proposed by Stockwell (2006). This choice is motivated by the fact that 
both theories have received extensive coverage and, more importantly, be-
cause they seem to display a considerable level of convergence.
In his approach to the structure of folk tales, Propp (1928/1984) claimed that 
every folk tale is composed of the so-called functions (cf. also Fokkema and 
Kunne-Ibsch 1979: 61–64). According to him, a function is “an act of a charac-
ter, defi ned from the point of view of its signifi cance for the course of action.” 
Such functions “serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of how 
and by whom they are fulfi lled” and as such “constitute the fundamental compo-
nents of a tale”(Propp 1928/1984: 21). For example, the sentences in (4) and (5) 
can be represented on a more abstract level of analysis as shown in (6):
(4)  The old man gives Sučenko a horse; the horse carries Sučenko to an-
other kingdom.
(5)  A king gives an eagle to a hero; the eagle carries the hero away to an-
other kingdom.
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(6)  Someone [1] gives a hero [2] a magical agent [3], which carries him 
away.
In (6), [1], [2] and [3] can be fi lled with different elements (or, to usePropp’s 
nomenclature: dramatis personae) which do not change the whole structure of 
a folk tale. However, according to Propp, the number of such functions is lim-
ited to thirty one altogether. Crucially, their sequence in a fairy tale is fi xed. 
The main disadvantage of this approach is that by claiming that this function-
division is applicable only to folk tales and not to literature in general, Propp 
drastically narrows the area to which the method could be applied. In addition, 
this analysis does not seem to include all the elements important for the crea-
tion of a given situation. Propp mentions only dramatis personae, or the ac-
tors, and pays little attention to defi ning the role of the context and/or objects 
involved. Only dramatis personae fi nd their way to the description of the nar-
rative event. Furthermore, the approach leads to certain problems with clas-
sifi cation. According to Propp (1928/1984: 22), “tales with identical functions 
can be considered as belonging to one type.” At the same time, he mentions 
that there is practically no variation as to the sequence of functions in a tale. 
While this may be true with regard to the folk tale, the question arises whether 
it could be applied to other types of writing without running the risk of multi-
plying the literary divisions ad infi nitum.
Cognitive poetics, in turn, provides literary scholars with a tool of greater 
fl exibility, namely, schemata. Not only do these tools maintain what is valu-
able in Propp’s theory, but at the same time they open new possibilities. In 
cognitive linguistics, a schema is “a schematised representation of detailed 
experiences” (Stockwell 2006: 8). What this means is that every successful or 
unsuccessful operation in our life is classifi ed and organized so that the next 
time we encounter a similar situation, we can act without undue hesitation. 
Stockwell (2006: 10–11) explains the reasons for the success of the schema 
theory to preserve what is valuable in Propp’s analysis in the following way: 
The framework includes a set of categories to operationalise the details of a sche-
ma. There are various kinds of ‘slots’ that are associated with any particular 
script and are assumed to be in operation when the schema is going. These are 
‘props’, ‘participants’, ‘entry conditions’, ‘results’ and the ‘sequence of events.’ 
As we can clearly see, there is a striking similarity between the two theo-
ries. In both of them we have certain ‘slots’ which can be fi lled with differ-
ent attributes. Where, then, does the advantage of the schema theory over 
that of Propp’s lie? The answer to this question lies in the dynamic character 
of schemata, which is necessitated by the fact that in our life we usually en-
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counter many similar, yet distinct situations. If schemata were deprived of 
their dynamic nature, there would be no sense in having them, because each 
new element would lead to creating a completely new schema and obviously 
the human brain aims at simplicity and economy.1
According to cognitive scholars, to protect itself from such ineffi ciency, 
the human brain has come up with the option of schema refreshment. This 
feature allows schemas to modify their internal structure rather than con-
struct themselves anew when faced with a new element. With such a res-
ervation made, schemata at fi rst glance seem to be an ideal tool for literary 
analysis. However, this is not so obvious, because as Stockwell (2006:11) 
rightly remarks, “the schema theory is based on commonality, whereas high 
quality literature tends to be based on uniqueness.” Schema refreshment fi lls 
the rift between the two tendencies, showing that it is precisely thanks to 
schemata that we can accommodate new experience, not only in real life, 
but also within the narrative.
This point can be illustrated with the stages of reception of The Trial by 
Franz Kafka. From the very fi rst words the reader’s interest is piqued by the 
fact that K, the main hero, has been accused without an obvious reason. This 
is a very clear example of a schema, the schema of LEGAL PROCEDURE. 
Our experience tells us that in order for somebody to be accused there must 
exist an entry condition of the law being broken by the person in question. 
It turns out that one of the reasons why the reader pursues the narrative 
with increasing interest is the desire to understand the destabilisation of the 
above-mentioned schema. But the narrative itself is insuffi cient for refresh-
ing the schema. In order to resolve the cognitive impasse, the reader must 
resort to his or her knowledge of the surrounding world and try to cope with 
literary nonsense. It is this fl exibility and multi-dimensionality of our liter-
ary competence that enables the reader to refresh the schema as well as to 
create a new one.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have demonstrated that structuralist and cognitive poetics seem 
to have a lot in common despite having completely divergent linguistic foun-
dations. The reason for the similarities seems to be that in striving to free lit-
erary analysis from wishy-washy essayism, both perspectives employ formal 
linguistics tools, thus taking a scientifi c approach to the study of literature. 
1 For example, there would be no one ‘restaurant schema,’ but rather a whole set of them, in-
cluding schemas for restaurants with spoons, restaurants without spoons, restaurants with and 
without tables, etc.
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However, this does not mean that cognitive poetics should be viewed merely 
as a structuralism relabelled. The fact that cognitive linguistics is cognitive has 
profound implications, because it allows for a more fl exible, yet very regular 
and coherent description of phenomena which have hitherto remained outside 
the scope of traditional approaches.
References
Culler, J. (1989). Structuralist Poetics. London: Routledge. 
Fokkema, D. W., Kunne-Ibsch, E. (1979). Theories of Literature in the Twentieth Century.  
London: Hurst & Company.
Gavins, J., Steen, G. (eds.) (2003). Cognitive Poetics in Practice. London: Routledge.
Propp, V. (1928/1984). Morphology of the Folk Tale. Texas: University of Texas Press.
Saussure, F. de. (1986). Course in General Linguistics. Chicago: Open Court Publishing 
Company.
Stockwell, P. (2002). Cognitive Poetics. An Introduction. London: Routledge.
Stockwell, P. (2006). Schema Theory: Stylistic applications. In: K. Brown et al. (eds.). En-
cyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics. Amsterdam: Elseviere Science. 8–13.
Sturrock, J. (2003). Structuralism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Tabakowska, E. (1995). Gramatyka i obrazowanie: Wprowadzenie do językoznawstwa kog-
nitywnego. Kraków: Wydawnictwo PAN.
